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of Lawyers: The Case of Group Legal
Services Under ERISA
INTODUCTION
Shortcomings in the traditional mechanisms for regulating lawyer
behavior have long been the subject of highly publicized debate.'
Collegial self-regulation has given way to a system of binding legal rules
enforced by state bar disciplinary bodies under the nominal supervision
of state supreme courts United States Supreme Court opinions
overturning traditional prohibitions against direct solicitation and
minimum fee schedules have undermined this disciplinary self-
governance.3 Less directly, judicial action under Rule 11, administrative
direction of the behavior of lawyers practicing before federal agencies,5
and a growing number of statutory actions under state and federal law
offer challenges to the existence of state-based regulation.' In some
I See, e.g., PRESIDENT's CoUNC.L ON CoMEnTvENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA , 1-6 (1991) (widely quoted statements by Vice President
Quayle); COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLDNARY ENFORCEMENT, AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N, REPORT TO THE HousE OF DELEGATES iii (1991) [hereinafter McKAY REPORT].
2 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.L 1239,
1251-52 (1991) (describing the transformation of fraternal norms into binding legal rules
as exemplified by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
3 Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988) (barring state ban on
direct solicitation in absence of mierepresentation or misleading statements); Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975) (finding a Sherman Act violation in bar
association's publication of a minimum fee schedule).
4 FED. R. CIV. P. 11. See Victor H. Kramer, Viewing Rule 11 as a Tool to Improve
Professional Responsibility, 75 MINN. L. REV. 793, 798 (1991) ("Rule 11 offers the
federal courts an opportunity to enforce professional responsibility rules that state
disciplinary bodies have been unable or unwilling to enforce.").
' See, e.g., William R. McLucas et al., SEC Enforcement: A Look at the Current
Program and Some Thoughts About the 1990s, 46 Bus. LAw. 797, 846-48 (1991) (noting
SEC actions in response to lawyer involvement with insider trading).
6 See Stephen Gillers, Ethics That Bite: Lawyers' Liability to Third Parties,
LIGATION, Winter 1987, at 8, 8-12. See generally Hazard, spmra note 2, at 1255-57
(discussing the changes in the state bars' authority as a result of Supreme Court decisions
and federal regulations).
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states, the hegemony of the state bar has been constrained or supplanted
by regulatory agencies similar to those regulating health care providers.7
The soundness of existing and proposed regulatory systems generally
depends on their efficiency, effectiveness, and preservation of lawyer
independence As Deborah Rhode noted, "[T]he bar's distinctive and
often appropriately adversarial relationship with the government calls for
special sensitivity to the potential for regulatory retaliation," 9 but the
insular quality of state-based disciplinary systems appears anomalous in
the context of contemporary multistate legal practice and the broad sweep
of federal regulatory schemes.
The policy makers' concerns with effective lawyer discipline implicate
broader questions regarding legal practice. As in the case of health care,
both the high cost of legal services and the lack of access to
representation are widely acknowledged problems."1  The present
underfinding of legal services for the indigent and the ever-present fear
of catastrophic expense on the part of all but the wealthiest Americans
tend to weaken the principle of equal access to justice.' Although the
United States Constitution mandates criminal representation, 3 in civil
actions and routine legal matters the average American may be
underserved by the traditional fee-for-service system.'4
7 See McKAY REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-7; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6086.9
(West 1990) (creating the "State Bar Discipline Monitor").
'See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 801,
819-52 (1992).
9 Deborah L. Rhode, The Rhetoric of Professional Reform, 45 MD. L. REV. 274, 293
(1986).
" See, e.g.,RacketeerlnfluencedandCorruptOrganizaions,Orgm dCrimeControlAt
of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988) (RICO provisions defining the violations of federal
law based upon racketeering activities and the legal process by which the government conducts
prosecutions and assesses penalties); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.C. § 78() (1988)
(anti-fraud provisions); Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1363-65 (8th Cir.) (finding authority
to prosecute lawyers for par icipating in a RICO enterprise), cert denied, sub no. Prudential
Ins. Co. ofnAmerica v. Bennett, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983). Hazardnotes that"increasingly dominant
power reposes in government regulatory authorities, including courts, legislatures, and
disciplinary agencies." Hazard, supra note 2, at 1279.
11 Ralph N. Jackson, A Brief Review of Existing Data on the Extent of Legal Needs
Among Middle Income Americans, Transcript of Proceedings, inNATIONAL CONFEREN CE
ON PREPAID LEGAL SviCms AND BEYOND 8, 8 (1974) [hereinafer ABA Proceedings].
'2 For a discussion of these needs in the context of group legal services, see id. at
10.
' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963).
14 The New Jersey Supreme Court noted
There is reason to believe that the practice of law by staff-operated prepaid
legal service plans is a useful innovation, serving the needs of many persons
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For over four decades, organizations have sought to overcome these
financial barriers by establishing group legal services, often using
insurance-like, risk-spreading mechanisms such as prepayment." The
imposition of an organizational intermediary between the client and the
lawyer, while common in many areas of legal practice, violates the
traditional model of direct representation underlying most rules of lawyer
behavior. The intermediary group that pays for the legal services and the
lawyer that provides the services may be subject to different state or
federal regulations,"' as is the case when an employer sponsors group
legal services.17
Federal regulation of lawyers arises primarily when the legal practice
intersects the domain of federal agencies such as the Securities and
Exchange Commission 8 ("SEC') or the Resolution Trust Corporation
who may be neither poor enough to secure legal aid nor wealthy enough to have
ready access to traditional law finn services... . If groups of persons ... seek
in conjunction with their mutual interests to provide legal services* to their
constituency, we see no supervening interest bearing on the regulation of the
legal profession that should militate against such efforts.
In re 1115 Legal Service Care, 541 A.2d 673, 676 (N.J. 1988).
Alec M. Schwartz, A Lawyer's Guide to Prepaid Legal Services, 15 LEGAL ECON.
43, 44 (July/Aug. 1989). Prepaid legal services plans, whether employer-sponsored or
individually contracted, are similar to prepaid health plans in providing a defined set of
benefits in return for a fixed periodic payment See id The most basic type of prepaid
legal services plan provides for "access services," such as the following: brief office
consultations, simple document drafting (e.g., wills), short letters or phone calls, and
discounted fee-for-service arrangements by referral to a participating lawyer who provides
more extensive services. Id. In contrast, "comprehensive" plans cover a larger amount of
services and are not limited to specified dollar or hour limits per year. Id. Some types of
service are customarily excluded, such as complex matters (e.g., patents and class
actions), tax preparation, contingent fee cases, and representation and reimbursement from
the subscribe's liability insurance. See id. at 44, 49. Comprehensive plans, which may
require copayments or deductibles, are sometimes referred to as legal insurance because
they reflect risk-spreading and actuarial estimates. Id. at 44. Their coverage is often
negotiated as part of an employee benefit package in the collective bargaining context.
Jesse H. Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual
Constitutional Rights, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1, 74-76 (1984).
6 See James E. Meeks, Antitrust Aspects of Legal Seri'ce Plans, in LEGAL SERVICE
PLANs: APPROACHES TO REGulATION 253, 269-74 (Werner Pfennigstorf & Spencer L.
Kimball eds., 1977).
17 Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988)
[hereinafter ERISA].
"See 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1992) (SEC's Rule 2(e) provides for the suspension and
disbarment of attorneys who are found to lack the qualifications to represent clients, to
have acted unethically, or to have wilfully violated a federal securities law); see, e.g., In
re William IL Carter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,165 (Mar. 7, 1979) (suspending two
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("RTC")."9 Unlike the practices governed by SEC or RTC standards, the
representation of a client under a group legal services plan is not an
obvious subject for federal action. In the case of SEC or RTC regulation,
the client is usually a corporate entity or an individual whose alleged
misdeeds took place in a corporate context.20  Conversely, the
representation of a group legal services plan member is normally confined
to the most mundane and personal of legal matters, and federal regulation
appears only because of the existence of the organizational
intermediary.21
The ERISA plan administrator is held to a stringent standard of
fiduciary responsibility." Similar standards apply to the lawyer serving
the plan members when the lawyer is found to be a "party in interest."
At the same time, lawyers are subject to state disciplinary codes in their
interaction with individual clients, regardless of group plan
sponsorship
The situation of lawyers in group legal services plans exemplifies the
difficulty of applying traditional norms of professional regulation to
contemporary legal practice. ERISA's invasion of the jealously guarded
state regulatory purview, while not as complete as the federal regulation
of patent lawyers, undermines some of the premises that form the basis
for state bar regulation. An examination of the peculiar status of group
legal services plan lawyers may thus suggest ways of adapting the
regulation of lawyers to the realities of the attorney-client relationship in
the absence of privity. The combination of federal law with the traditional
state disciplinary regulation for group legal services may provide a natural
lawyers from practice before the SEC because of their complicity in a company's issuing
of misleading financial information), rev'd, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,170
(Feb. 28, 1981) (full commission finding that administrative law judge held lawyers to
a standard exceeding ethical rules).
' See, e.g., Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(i)(2) (1989) [hereinafter FIRREA] (providing for civil money penalties against
"institution-affiliated parties," including lawyers, for violations of any law or regulation);
FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1828G)(4) (providing for civil money penalties for violations of the
Federal Reserve Act).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78(b), (c) (1988) (discussing the scope of the Securities and
Exchange regulations and defining the relevant items); 12 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (b), (e), (f)
(1989) (creating the RTC and defining its scope and purpose).
" See ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
" Id. §§ 1002(21), 1104(a)(1)(B); see infra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
" Id. § 1002(14)(B).
See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text. To further complicate matters,
lawyers employed by a legal services plan may join a union.
s See surra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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experiment in the accommodation of state bar and federal regulatory
interests.
The next section of this Note discusses the history and current status
of group legal services regulation by the organized bar and the judicial
system2 Part II describes the status of employer-sponsored group legal
services plans under ERISA regulations and associated judicial
decisions.27 This Note concludes with an analysis of the effect of joint
state and federal regulation and its potential consequences in other areas
of legal practice.'
I. HISTORY OF GROUP LEGAL SERVICES REGULATION
A. Early Cases and Supreme Court Decisions
Judicial enforcement of the organized bar's constraints marked the
early regulation of group legal services" During the 1960s, the
Supreme Court held most of these restrictions to be unconstitutional.'
Courts generally approved group legal services when they were offered
under bar association auspices31 but prohibited attempts to provide such
services without official bar sponsorship.' Bar associations thus
26See infra notes 29-105 and accompanying text
See infra notes 106-98 and accompanying text
" See infra notes 199-227 and accompanying text.
Norman J. Riedmueller, Group Legal Service and the Organized Bar, 10 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 228, 246 (1973).
30 United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. minois St. Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22
(1967) (holding that the First Amendment protects the right of the United Mine workers
to employ an attorney to help members withworkmen compensation claims); Brotherhood
of LR Trainmen v. Virginia ex reL Virginia St. Bar Ass'n, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (holding
that the First Amendment protects the right of union members to receive recommendation
regarding attorney representation for injured workers); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
444 (1963) (holding that Virginia's regulation of those organizations dedicated to
eliminating racial discrimination violates the First Amendment). For an extensive
discussion of the influence of the organized bar on judicial acceptance of legal service
plans and subsequent actions by the U.S. Supreme Court, see Riedmueller, supra note 29,
at 231-54.
3, See, e.g., Jacksonville Bar Ass'n v. Wilson, 102 So. 2d 292, 295 (Fla. 1958)
(approving bar association-sponsored lawyer referral services); Gumnels v. Atlanta Bar
Ass'n, 12 S.E.2d 602, 610 (Ga. 1940) (approving bar association plan to aid victims of
usury).
3 See People ex rel. Los Angeles Bar Ass'n v. California Protective Corp., 244 P.
1089 (Cal. Ct App. 1926) (stating that a corporation's providing legal services to its
patrons for a fee constitutes the unauthorized practice of law); People ex rel. Lawyers'
Inst. of San Diego v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 209 P. 363, 364 (Cal. 1922) (a
1993-941
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challenged automobile clubs seeking to provide prepaid legal services plans
to their members. The bar associations based their arguments on professional
standards such as those banning solicitation, fee-splitting, the unauthorized
practice of law, and practice in the corporate form.3
One pioneer of group legal services, the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen ('BRT"), encountered persistent opposition in several
jurisdictions.O The BRT established a legal aid plan in 1930, and its activity
gave rise to a series of cases culminating in the landmark Supreme Court
opinion of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex reL Virginia
State Bar s Union representatives advised injured union members of their
need for legal counsel and referred the members to lawyers chosen by the
union. The plan was challenged first in Illinois,' and the Illinois court
upheld the plan against claims of impropriety regarding loans,3
solicitation, and fee-spitting In Ohio, the Cleveland Bar Association
backed away from its initial approval of the BRT plan and sought to enjoin
its members from participating BRT lawyers also encountered opposition
from the organized bar in California, New York, Tennessee, and Missouri!'
In the 1960s, the civil rights movement gave rise to controversy with
state bar authorities, and the eventual resolution of this controversy favored
corporation may not lawfully invade the ordinary practice of the legal profession); State
ex rel. Lmdin v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 177 P. 694, 696 (Wash. 1919) (commercial
association violated the prohibition against corporate legal practice by contracting with
lawyers); In re Gill, 176 P. 11, 13 (Wash. 1918) (disbarring lawyers who contracted with
a corporation engaged in the solicitation of law business).
3 See People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 199 N.E. 1, 2 (IlL
1935) (court approval of an amendment to an ethical canon that withdrew the bar
association's initial approval of the Chicago Motor Club's activities); People ex reL
Chicago Bar Ass'nv. Motorists' Ass'n of l., 188 N.E. 827, 829 (11. 1933) (holding that
the defendant's sponsoring of a group constituted practicing law without a license);
Seawell v. Carolina Motor Club, 184 S.E. 540, 544 (N.C. 1936) (relying on the
prohibition against corporate practice); Rhode Island Bar Ass'nv. Automobile Serv. Ass'n,
179 A. 139, 142 (ILI. 1935) (finding a violation of the unauthorized practice rule). But
see In re Thibodeau, 3 N.E.2d 749, 751 (Mass. 1936) (approving similar activity when
the organization exercises minimal control; notably, state bar association involvement wasabsent).
a See Riedmueller, supra note 29, at 239-45.
377 U.S. 1 (1964).
Ryan v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 268 IMI. App. 364 (1ll 1932).
37 Id. at 375-76.
31 Id. at 374.
39 Id. at 379.
40 In re Petition of the Committee on Rule 28 of the Cleveland Bar Ass'n, 15 Ohio
L. Abs. 106, 108 (Ohio Ct. App. 1933).
41 See Riedmueller, supra note 29, at 241-45.
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the development of group legal plans. In NAACP v. Button,2 the
Supreme Court invalidated a state law banning solicitation of legal
business 3 The Court construed the law as prohibiting the providing of
services by NAACP staff lawyers to its members." Application of the
Virginia statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments because
the "vigorous advocacy" practiced by the NAACP was protected
speec 45 Not only was the Virginia statute unconstitutionally vague,
but its intended prohibition of unprofessional or malicious conduct did
not extend to the NAACP's activities.47 While alluding to state actions
against legal services plans based on ethical rather than statutory
violations, the Button decision did not address the constitutionality of
the ethical canons that formed the basis for the Virginia statute.
The implications of NAACP v. Button for unions' group plans were
not lost on the Court. In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia
ex rel Virginia State Bar,4" the Supreme Court found that Virginia
statutes prohibiting the legal services activities of the BRT violated First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.m Following BRT, two cases further
defined the individual's constitutional right to collectively sponsored legal
representation. In United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Association,"' the
Court extended constitutional protection to the services of a lawyer whose
salary was paid by a union.52 The Court found that the First Amendment
rights embodied in the legal services available through the union were
more important than the mere possibility of harm arising from a violation
of the state's interest in regulating lawyer behavior. 3 Four years later,
the Court held in United Transportation Union v. State Bar of
Michigan' that the First Amendment protected the union's right to act
371 U.S. 415 (1963).
The Virginia statute prohibited the "solicitation of legal business in the form of
'runnig or 'ceppWn... :" Id. at 423. After amendment, the statute 'includ[ed], in the
definition of 'runner' or 'capper,' an agent -for an individual or organization which retains
a lawyer in connection with an action to which it is not a party." Id.
44 Id. at 428-29.
41 Id. at 428-29.
46 Id. at 432.
47 Id. at 444.
4 See 1d. at 442 n.25.
4377 U.S. 1 (1964).
-0 Id. at 8.
st 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
' Id. at 221-22.
Id. at 223-25 (noting a complete absence of reported harm to members).
401 U.S. 576 (1971). United Transportation Union was the new organizational
manifestation of the earlier BRT. The union controlled legal fees and informed its
1993-94]
KNTUCKY LAW JouRNA[
collectively to obtain affordable and effective legal representation.'
Summarizing these holdings, Justice Brennan stated: "The common thread
running through our decisions in NAACP v. Button, Trainmen, and United
Mine Workers is that collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningu
access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the
First Amendment."'
B. Amendments to the Model Code
The organized bar's initial response to these judicial trends was to
create an exception to Disciplinary Rule 2-103(D) of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.' This rule provides that a lawyer
may cooperate in a dignified manner with the legal services activities
of.. . [a] non-profit organization that recommends, furnishes, or pays
for legal services to its members or beneficiaries, but only in those
instances and to the extent that controlling constitutional interpretation
at the time of rendition of the services requires the allowance of such
legal activities.O
members that recommended lawyers would waive charges. The state bar contended that
this conduct violated statutory provisions forbidding fee-sharing. The complaint and
records, however, failed to support the allegations. Id. at 584.
ss Id. at 585.
Id. Despite the conclusive nature of these Supreme Court holdings, some states
banned "closed paner' groups as recently as 1988. See, e.g., In re 1115 Legal Service
Care, 541 A.2d 673, 678 (N.J. 1988) (recommending an amendment to state disciplinary
rules to allow operation of "nn-commercial, staff-operated prepaid legal service plans"
such as the union-sponsored entity at issue). Florida's standards for prepaid legal services
plans still require "an affirmative statement informing plan participants that they are free
to use a nonplan panel attorney (at their own expense or with reimbursement by the
group/plan sponsor as the case may be)." The Florida Bar re: Amendment to Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar, 605 So. 2d 252, 425 (1992). This provision suggests an
ongoing bias, though not an outright ban, concerning closed panels.
In addition to the dubious constitutionality of the discriminatory treatment of group
legal services plans, the restraint of legal services plans by state bar associations may
violate antitrust laws. See Meeks, supra note 16, at 265-66. The Supreme Court, however,
has noted that a state supreme court's disciplinary rules would come within the antitrust
exemption that allows restraint of trade when a state acts in its sovereign capacity. Bates
v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 363 (1977).
'7 For a discussion of the organized bar's response to the Supreme Court's rulings,
see 1. Robert Kramer II, Comment, Group Legal Serv'ces: From Houston to Chicago, 79
DiCK. L. REv. 621 (1974-75).
M MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrTY DR2-103(D)(5) (1969) (amended
1980). Subsequent amendments deleted the overt reference to the bar's accommodation
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The Code still restricted group legal services practice to organizations
whose primary purpose did not include "the rendition of legal
services,"" and the performance of these services had to be "incidental
and reasonably related to the primary purposes of such organization." '
The Code also prohibited the organization's receipt of any financial
benefit resulting from the plan."
Subsequent developments in the Model Code loosened restrictions on
participation in group legal services plans.' For example, amendments
passed in 1975 abolished discrimination between open and closed panel
plans.' The amended Code, however, still prohibited an organization
from profiting from the rendition of legal services," thereby insulating
the bar from insurance company sponsorship of legal services plans.
Amended DR 2-103(D)(4)(b), by prohibiting the initiation or promotion
of constitutional mandates, labelled "embarrassing' by Wolfram. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL EnmCS § 16.5.5, at 912 (1986).
DR 2-103(D)(5)(a).
DR 2-103(D)(5)(b). For an unsuccessful challenge to a similar restriction, see
Allison v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 362 So. 2d 489, 496 (La. 1978) (upholding
restrictions as constitutional).
' DR 2-103(D)(5)(c). For an extensive survey of the effect of various Model Code
provisions on prepaid legal plans, see Werner Pfennigstorf & Spencer L. Kimball,
Employee Legal Service Plans Conflicts Between Federal and State Regulation, in LEGAL
SERVICE PLANS: APPROACHES TO REGuTION, supra note 16, at 240-48.
" See generally Kramer, supra note 57 (comparing the 1974 Houston Amendments
to the Code with the adopted Chicago Amendments that addressed the ethical and
constitutional issues created by regulating group legal services).
The organized bar itself entered into prepaid and other group legal services
arrangements on a sporadic and limited basis during the period of general opposition to
such plans. See LumAN DE1TCH & DAvID WEINSTEIN, PREPAID LEGAL SERVICEs 25
(1976); Werner Pfennigstorf & Spencer L. Kimball, A Typology of Legal Services Plans,
in LEGAL SERVICE PLANS: APPROACHES TO REGULATION, supra note 16, at 42-47;
Riedmueller, supra note 29, at 255-59. Programs were also developed in the context of
legal education, either directly as part of the curriculum, or indirectly by arrangement with
the sponsoring groups. See ABA Proceedings, supra note 11, at 156-75.
' Kramer, supra note 57, at 637-41; see also WOLFRAM, supra note 58, § 16.5, at
913 (noting removal of the requirement that closed plans reimburse the cost of non-
participating attorney representation).
Legal services configurations fall into one of three patterns: "open panel," "closed
panel," and '!mixed plans." In an open panel plan, the consumer can choose his or her
own lawyer, subject to minimum qualifications and contractul limits. A closed panel plan
limits consumer choice to a predetermined group of lawyers. In mixed plans, advice and
basic services are provided by a selected group of lawyers, while other lawyers are used
for more extensive services, subscribers who reside in other states, and where a conflict
of interest arises. See Schwartz, supra note 15, at 46.
6' DR 2-103(D)(4)(a); see WOLFRAM, supra note 58, § 16.5.5, at 914.
1993-94]
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of a legal services organization "for the primary purpose of providing
financial or other benefit"' 5 to a lawyer, appeared to prohibit plans that
functioned as referral channels for closed panel groups.' Futhennore, many
reporting requirements, some well beyond those applied to conventional legal
practices, continued to burden legal services plans.'
C. Current State Law: Group Legal Services Under the Model Rules
Unlike the Model Code, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct have
eliminated the special requirements for participation in group legal services
plans. The Model Rules acknowledge that when a recipient of legal services
does not bear costs directly, ethical and regulatory issues arise. The most
familiar example is motor vehicle insurance defense, but similar concerns
arise in liability insurance defense, class actions, corporate representation
involving employees, and contingent fee suits.' The Model Rules provide
the following ground rules:
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from
one other than the client unless:
(1) the client consents after consultation;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer' independence of
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as
required by [Model] Rule 1.6
Two concers of the drafters of the Model Rules were conflicts of interest
between the represented party and the third party payor and interference with
independent professional judgment.70 The official comment to Model Rule
1.7 resolves these issues by requiring the third party to arrange for
independent counsel.7
6' DR 2-103(D)(4)(b).
6WOLFRAM, supra note 58, § 16.5.5, at 914.
DR 2-103(D)(4)(f); see WOLFRAM, supra note 58, § 16.5.5, at 915. While the
Model Rules have effectively abolished impediments to group legal practice other than
those general ethical considerations applicable to all practices, the Code is still in effect
in some states. Thus, courts must harmonize the Code with the Supreme Court's well-
established protection of legal services plans.
S See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.7 cmnt. (1983) [h ner
MODEL RULES].
9 MODEL RULES Rule 1.8(f).
71 Id. at cmt.
71 Id.
A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the client is
informed of that fact and consents and the aangement does not compromise
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The Model Rules express a broad concern in Rule 1.6 regarding the
maintenance of client confidentiality against disclosure demands of third
party payors.? The official comment indicates the breadth of this
prohibition: 'The confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters
communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information
relating to the representation, whatever its source."3 Absent an explicit
waiver, then, the subject matter of a client's interaction with a third-party-
sponsored lawyer could not be disclosed to the payor.74 Confidentiality
and conflict of interest concerns also dictate that when a plan covers two
members who enter into a legal dispute with one another, arrangements
must be made for independent representation of one of the parties.75
In addition to the overarching ethical concerns, there are other
problems common to situations involving third party payment for legal
services. The extent to which the third party payor bears costs for which
it is liable under contract is often at issue and is extensively regulated by
state law.7' Prohibitions against the unauthorized practice of law by
nonlawyer third parties are complemented by restrictions on the corporate
form of legal practice when a nonlawyer is a part owner, director, or
officer,' or otherwise "has the right to direct or control the professional
judgment of a lawyer."'78 The regulation concerning advertising of legal
services, while less stringent than in the past, still speaks to third party
payors in its general prohibition against compensating a person or entity
who recommends a lawyer's services, since the promotional efforts of the
third party may include such a recommendation. 9
the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client ... For example, when an insurer and
its insured have conflicting interests in a matter arising from a liability
insurance agreement, and the insurer is required to provide special counsel for
the insured, the arrangement should assure the special counsel's professional
independence.
MODEL RULES Rule 1.7 cmt
' "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless
the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authoried
in order to cany out the representation." MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(a).
7 Id. at cmt.
74 MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(a).
7 See ROGER D. BHnNGS, XL, PREPAID LEGAL SERviCES § 3.33 (Lawyers Co-op.
1981 & Supp. 1985).
76 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.12-.230 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988)
(Kentucky insurance bad faith statute).
7 MODEL RULES Rule 5.4(d).
7' MODEL RULES Rule 5.4(d)(3).
"' MODEL RULES Rule 7.2(c).
1993-941
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The Model Rules and many analogous state guidelines have eliminated
the prohibition contained in DR 2-103(D)(4)(a) of the Model Code against
participation in for-profit plans.s° Model Rule 5.4, which prohibits fee-
sharing with nonlawyers, does not ban participation in a legal services plan,
even when the plan is for profit." Likewise, while Model Rule 7.2(c)
prohibits a lawyer from giving "anything of value to a person for
recommending the lawyer's services," it excepts "the usual charges of a...
legal service organization." An official comment notes that "[tihis
restriction does not prevent ... a prepaid legal services plan [from paying]
to advertise legal services provided under its auspices."'
Model Rule 7.3, which limits an attomeyl direct contact with prospective
clients, underwent major revision in light of Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Association, in which the Supreme Court held that a total state ban on
direct mail solicitation by attorneys violated the First Amendment.s The
Official Comments to the Model Rules carefully distinguish the restrictions
on individual solicitation of legal business from the dissemination of
information about legal services plans:
This Rule is not intended to prohibit a lawyer from contacting
representatives of organizations or groups that may be interested in
establishing a group or prepaid legal plan for their members, insureds,
beneficiaries, or other third parties for the purpose of informing such entities
of the availability of and details concerning the plan.... This form of
communication is not directed to a prospective client. Rather, it is usually
addressed to an individual acting in a fiduciary capacity seeking a supplier
of legal services for others who may, if they choose, become prospective
clients of the lawyer.s
This standard would permit even face-to-face solicitation of legal business
when a lawyer interacts with the representative of an employer-sponsored
legal plan.
" See, e.g., The Florida Bar re: Amendment to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 605
So. 2d 252, 424 (1992) (setting specific requirements for plan and participant approval
by the bar association's Board of Governors).
" ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 355, at 17 (1987)
("Participation of a lawyer in a for-profit prepaid legal service plan is permissible under
the Model Rules, provided the plan is in compliance with the guidelines in this opinion.").
'2MODEL RUms Rule 7.2(c).
"Id. at cm
"486 U.S. 466 (1988).
"Id. at 476.
"MODEL RuLES Rule 7.3 cnt.
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The comment correctly distinguishes the situation in which a firm
negotiates with a contracting group from the Model Rule 7.3 situation
involving intrusive and overbearing solicitation of clients.O Negotiations
or presentations regarding the contractual relationship between an ERISA
legal services plan and an employer or other fiduciary lack the elements
of client vulnerability and unequal access to information that make direct
solicitation potentially abusive." If the plan solicits members by
describing its lawyer-providers in laudatory terms, however, the
participating lawyer may rnm afoul of restrictions on advertising or
payment for referrals and recommendations.
Model Rule 5.4(a) states that "[a] lawyer or law firm shall not share
legal fees with a nonlawyer."" As Wolfram notes, a literal reading of
this provision would suggest a prohibition of any employment that entails
payment from a group legal services plan to a lawyer (or vice versa).'
However, Model Rule 6.3 and its comments encourage lawyers "to
support and participate in legal service organizations, 9, thus indicating
that a proper interpretation of Model Rule 5.4(a) would limit its
application to payment for impermissible solicitation of clients.
In general, the Model Rules should be read broadly so as to permit
group legal services, including participation in plans administered by for-
profit insurance companies, direct hiring of lawyers for employee legal
services plans, and consultation and referral systems.93 Closed and open
panels, in-house and contract services, and even direct promotion of a
legal services organization appear to be permitted, provided that the plans
observe the general rules regarding confidentiality and solicitation?'
D. Current Trends in Group Legal Services
While the position of prepaid and other group legal services in the
contemporary legal marketplace originated with union-negotiated plans,-
other parties to these plans have included credit unions,' credit card
"See id.
MODEL RULES Rule 5A(a).
WOLFRAM, supra note 58, § 16.5.5, at 916.
MODEL RULES Rule 6.3 cmt
WOLFRAM, supra note 58, § 16.5.5, at 917.
9Id.
" Id.
9Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 16, at 199.
" See Charles Harris, Utah Prepaid Legal Services Plan Transcript of Proceedings,
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holders,' bank depositors, association members (as in Button98), and
other group purchasers. 9 Participation in prepaid legal services plans is
increasingly a function of individual enrollment rather than employee
fringe benefits.l" For example, in 1987, only 2.3 million of an
estimated 13.5 million prepaid plan enrollees were in plans funded by
associations or unions.10
Insurance companies market legal services plans much as they do
other forms of insurance, although their efforts are not currently
widespread.'2 Storefront chains such as Hyatt Legal Services have also
entered the prepaid-plan market, offering a variety of options tailored to
individual corporate clients' needs.' While centralized off-site
management is necessary for the functioning of these legal groups, the
in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES AND BEYOND 32-39 (1974);
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 1313 (1975)
("appropriate and dignified notice" of services to members of credit union appear not to
violate Disciplinary Rules); Connors v. Katz, 393 N.Y.S.2d 579 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)
(finding that agreement was between individual members and the law finn rather than
constituting legal services plan). Where a credit union limits its membership to employees
of identified groups and employees control its organization, a voluntary enrollment
prepaid legal services program sponsored by the credit union may be classified as an
ERISA plan. See BLLINGS, supra note 75, § 6.18.
' See Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v. Gold Shield, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1232, 1237
(Ohio 1975) (enjoining lawyers from participation in an enterprise that was under
corporate direction and financed through major credit card companies). Signature Group,
a subsidiary of Montgomery Ward, has developed legal plans using marketing strategies
common for other types of insurance, apparently without interference by either
disciplinary bodies or other regulatory entities. See Carroll Seron, Managing
Entrepreneurial Legal Services, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES:
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 75-77 (Robert L. Nelson et al
eds., 1992).
See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Pfennigstorf & Kimball, A Typology of Legal Services Plans, in LEGAL
SERVICE PLANS: APPROACHES TO REGULATION, supra note 16, at 26-27 (quoting Army
Regulation No. 608-50, Feb. 22, 1974, No. 3, which provides: "[p]ersonal legal
difficulties may contribute to a state of low morale and inefficiency, and may result in
problems requiring disciplinary action. Prompt assistance in resolving these difficulties
is an effective preventive measure.").
10 See LAws. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 81:2505 (1988) (citing
Aggregate Legal Services Plan Statistics, National Resource Center for Consumers of
Legal Services, Legal Plan Letter, No. 147 (March 8, 1988)).
... Id. The number of individuals actually covered by these plans is somewhat greater,
since many include family members. See Schwartz, supra note 15, at 43.
1,, See Seron, supra note 97, at 77-79 (noting that Nationwide Insurance markets legal
plans in thirty-seven states).
"3 Id. at 74-75.
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personal nature of the services provided makes the day-to-day experience
of participating lawyers comparable to that of the "traditional small-firm
or solo practice."1  Despite these links with the familiar experience of
consumer and lawyer, however, legal services plans have not followed
third-party health care coverage in becoming a dominant mode of
professional compensation. 5
If. FEDERAL REGULATION AND CASES UNDER ERISA
A. ERISA and Employer-Sponsored Group Legal Services"
The purpose of ERISA is to "protect ... the interest of participants
in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries ... by establishing
standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligations for fiduciaries of
employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies,
sanctions, and ready access to the federal courts."" ERISA regulates
prepaid group legal services plans provided as an employee benefit"'s
unless the plans fit one or more narrow exceptions."°
Congress intended for ERISA to remedy the conflicts and
inadequacies of state employee benefit regulation.110 The Taft-Hartley
Act.1 ERISA's predecessor in the movement toward unitary regulation.
1'4 Id. at 64.
... See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
" For a comprehensive review of ERISA regulations and case law, see BILLINGS,
supra note 75, § 6.
107 ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988).
'o Id. § 1002(1).
' A 1985 Deparlment of Labor regulation excludes from ERISA regulation those
plans that meet the following criteria:
(1) No conlributions are made by an employer or employee organization;
(2) Participation [in] the program is completely voluntary for employees or
members,
(3) The sole functions of the employer or employee organization with
respect to the program are, without endorsing the program, to permit the insurer
to publicize the program to employees or members, to collect premiums through
payroll deductions or dues checkoffs, and to remit them to the insurer, and
(4) The employer or employee organization receives no consideration inthe
form of cash or otherwise in connection with the program, other than reasonable
compensation, excluding any profit, for administrative services actually rendered
in connection with payroll deductions or dues checkoffs.
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(0) (1985).
"0 See BujINGS, supra note 75, § 6.1.
... Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1988).
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of legal services plans, contained a provision for legal services plans
among the collectively bargained benefits subject to federal
regulation."' The Taft-Hartley Act laid the foundation for ERISA's
structural standards for employee legal services plans by requiring
payment of plan finances into a trust fund for the exclusive benefit of
employees and their dependents, joint administration by equal numbers
of employer and employee trustees, and annual audits."'
The broad scope of ERISA and its federalization of employee
benefits law have fundamentally restructured benefits litigation. ERISA's
definition of an "employee welfare benefit plan" encompasses most funds
or programs that are maintained by employers or employee organizations
and that provide for medical, disability, death, unemployment prepaid
legal services, or other non-pension benefits."' State regulation of most
employee benefit plans is preempted by section 514(a) of ERISA."'
This federal preemption serves ERISA's goals of uniformity and
regulation of multistate corporations, but deprives plaintiffi of common
law remedies and forces them into federal courts.'16
The regulatory core of ERISA imposes explicit fiduciary duties on a
wide range of individuals involved with employee benefit plans, including
plan administrators and other defined parties in interest."7 ERISA
2 Id. § 186(c)(8).
"3 Id. § 186(c)(5)(B), (c)(8).
114 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). ERISA does not apply to plans sponsored by governmental
entities or churches, or those run by U.S. employers in foreign countries for nonresident
aliens. Id. § 1003(b).
..s See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-67 (1987) (holding that
complaints grounded in state common law causes of action are removable to federal court
under ERISA); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeanx, 481 U.S. 41, 50 (1987) (holding that, as
a statute 'egulating insurance," a state insurance bad faith statute was preempted by
ERISA); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985) (finding
state law compensatory and punitive damages remedies to be unavailable against an
ERISA plan fiduciary). But see Warren v. Society Nat'lBank, 905 F.2d 975, 980 (6th Cir.
1990) (limiting Russell by finding monetary damages available to redress direct iijury by
plan fiduciary).
l16 Jay Conison, The Federal Law of ER'SA Plan Attorneys, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1049, 1086 (1985).
117 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1988). ERISA defines the parties subject to these standards in
§ 1002(21) (plan trustees) and § 1002(14) (other parties in interest). See, for example,
Whitfield v. Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1298, 1307 (5th Cir. 1988), in which the court found
an attorney liable for the plan trustee's reliance on the attorney's valuation of assets
acquired by an ERISA plan. Without finding that the attorney held fiducimary status, the
court held the attorney jointly liable with the trustee for the plan's losses attributable to
his misleading valuation. See also McLaughlin v. Biasucci, 688 F. Supp. 965, 968
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describes this duty, which is based on the common law of trusts, as acting
"with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with
like aims."' 8
Transactions between statutory fiduciaries and defined parties in interest
are a particular concern because the fiduciary may attempt to avoid her
obligations by delegating duties to another party. ERISA generally prohibits
such delegation,19 but offers several narrow exemptions.'20 The fiduciary
who breaches his duty to an ERISA plan
shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan
resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of
such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by
the fiduciary, and shall be sulject to such other equitable or remedial relief
as the Court may deem appropriate, including removal of such
fiduciary.
2 1'
Nonfiduciaries, including lawyers, who participate in a breach have generally
been found liable as well."
One goal of ERISA is to foster the growth ofprepaid group legal services
plans by preempting the regulatory efforts of state bar associations and other
state disciplinary authorities. m The legislative history of ERISA reflects
congressional disapproval of the efforts of state bar associations to impede the
formation of "closed panel" legal plans 4 through disciplinary regulations
forbidding lawyer participation in plans that restrict client access to specified
attorneys.' As one of ERISAs primary sponsors stated, "mhe State,
(S.DYN.Y. 1988) (allowing. the trustee, as a third party complainant, to assert claims of
negligence and malpractice against the plan attomy because the claim was closely
connected to the fiduciary's breach of duty).
n 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1988).
It d. § 1106(a).
'o Id. § 1108.
12 Id. § 1109(a).
' See cases cited supra note 117; see also H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 295 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.AN. 5038, 5075 ("Fiduciaries (and
parties-in-interest) are to be personally liable under the labor provisions for losses
sustained by a plan that result from a violation of these [prohibited transaction] rnles.").
But see Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1988) (limiting scope of nonfiduciary
liability to direct participation in a prohibited transaction).
' See Conison, supra note 116, at 1094.
" See sira note 63 for a description of a closed panel plan.
'
2 See Conison, suipra note 116, at 1095; Robert S. McDonough, ER/SA Preemption
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directly or indirectly through the bar, is preempted from regulating the form
and content of a legal service plan, for example, open versus closed panels,
in the guise of disciplinary or ethical rules or proceedings.""
While ERISA preempts any state regulation restricting participation in
legal services plans, it does not preempt all state regulation of the plan
lawyers'conduct. The legislative history makes this distinction clear by stating
that ERISA does not preempt "bar association ethical rles, guidelines or
disciplinary actions.""1 27 That is, "[a] general ethical rule or normal
disciplinary action ... is not preempted by ERISA, even though the law
'relates to'the plan in the sense that the plan is not shielded from its generally
applicable effects (e.g., the attorneys it refers to must be admitted to thebar).,, 29
The New York Court of Appeals clarified this distinction in 1975 when
it noted in dicta that although ERISA may "pre-empt the regulation of union
prepaid legal services plans, qua plans,... [ilt does not reach the professional
licensure and regulation of lawyers, qua lawyers, who would render legal
services under the plans.' 9 The court defined the state regulatory functions
as the following:
to assess the authenticity of the plan, to assure its freedom from any taint of
improper professional conduct, to preserve the attorney-client relation, to
require ful disclosure to prevent fraud or other wrong upon the public, and,
above all, to make sure that future professional conduct on behalf of
[prepaid legal services plans]... remains subject to disciplinary control by
the Appellate Division.
130
While it may be argued that the authenticity of an ERISA legal services plan
is a federal rather than a state matter, the court otherwise appears to be in
harmony with ERISAs legislative history.
of State Mandated-Provider Laws, 1985 DuKE L.J. 1194, 1201 (1985) (organized labor
and consumer groups feared that bar associations would block closed panel formation).
While analysis of ERISA's preemption of state laws regulating employee benefit plans
centers primarily on health benefit plans, it is noteworthy that the first to raise this issue
were consumer and labor groups concerned with access to prepaid legal plans.
120 CONG. REC. 29,949 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Jacob Javits).
'Id.
mWillim I. Kilberg & Paul D. Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to
Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERJ4 Section 514, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1313, 1329
n.80 (1984).
1'2 Feinstein v. Attorney-General, 326 N.E.2d 288, 292 (N.Y. 1975).
1 Id. at 291; see also In re UAW Legal Services Plan, 416 N.Y.S.2d 133, 134 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1979) (holding that ERISA does not preempt this level of regulation of state
lawyers in a prepaid legal services plan).
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The legal services employee benefit trus 31 provides the structure
for an ERISA plan, and is regulated by the National Labor Relations Act
as well as ERISA. 2 These trusts act as both the administrator and the
underwriter in the case of collectively bargained agreements. Equal
numbers of employer and employee representatives must act as trustees,
and each is held to a high level of fiduciary responsibility.133 Detailed
regulations specify the structure of ERISA benefit plans and reporting
requirements.1
34
In light of the current concern over the financial burden legal services
impose upon individual and corporate payors, pressure to minimize the
cost of legal services may detract from the lawyer's ability to meet client
needs." This risk parallels the general concern over interference with
professional judgment and the duty of loyalty to the client." In the
classic scenario, disagreement between client and insurer may exist
regarding the decision to settle or defend under a liability insurance
policy. The lawyer may feel pressure to settle regardless of the client's
desires. Obviously, under-representation would be an infraction in the
context of group legal services as well. Moreover, the plan's financial
arrangements may motivate the lawyer to provide more or less
representation than he would to a similarly situated fee-for-service client.
The client may thus complain that the administrator denied him plan
benefits.
The question of what services are covered under a given plan has
been litigated extensively in the area of employee welfare and health plan
benefits (the category to which legal services plans belong). 7 Until
1989, courts generally deferred to the plan administrator's determination
of entitlement to benefits unless it was "arbitrary and capricious."1 In
1989, the Supreme Court announced a de novo standard of review, 39
which has been applied in many subsequent employee welfare benefit
cases. 4 The application of this standard to legal services benefit claims,
- 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
m Nat'lLabor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1988); ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1103.
' See BILLNGS, supra note 75, §§ 6.63-.67, 6.87.
U See id. §§ 6.28-.56, 6.68-.81.
'3' See id. § 3.29.
L' See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text
11
7 See Julia F. Costich, Denial of Coverage for 'Experimental" Medical Procedures:
The Problem of De Novo Review Under ERNA, 79 KY. L.J. 801, 807 n.42 (1990-91).
W See, e.g., Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 846 F.2d 416, 419 (7th Cir.
1988).
"9 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).4 Often, these cases involve experimental treatments for cancer. See Costich, spra
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however, has not yet been litigated. The Sixth Circuit's 1990 decision in
Peny v. Simplicity Engineering41 may provide a small measure of
reassurance in its holding that true de novo review, including information
not considered by the plan administrator, amounts to "federal district
courts ... function[ing] as substitute plan administrators," a role not
intended by Congress."
B. Cases on ERISA Regulation of Employer-Sponsored Legal
Services Plans
1. Fiduciary Duty Cases
Reported cases involving ERISA's provisions regulating prepaid legal
services providers are sparse but dramatic. In Benvenuto v. Schneider,"
trustees of a union legal services benefit trust and the law firm that
provided contract services were held jointly and severally liable for
overpayment of $292,800 plus interest and costs.'" The trustees had
interviewed and taken bids from only one firm and had failed to monitor
utilization, analyze services in light of payments, or insure appropriate use
of plan assets.'" Some evidence suggested that the plan trustees, acting
under the complete domination of an imprisoned union president,
colluded with the law firm." The law firm did minimal work, used
unqualified personnel, kept no time records, and "received excessive
amounts of money in relationship to the services rendered and benefits
received."' 47
The plan trustees received sanctions for their breach of fiduciary
duties as defined in sections 404(a)(1)(A) and (B) of ERISA.'" The
court, apparently believing that the unusual nature of the action against
the law firm required an additional explanation, stated that the firm
members "knew by their actions that they were receiving money in
violation of ERISA and participated with the Trustees in breaching
note 137, at 815-24.
141 900 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1990).
'42Id. at 966.
143 678 F. Supp. 51 (E.DN.Y. 1988).
144 Id. at 55.
14s Id. at 52.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 54.
148 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1004(a)(1)(A), (B)).
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fiduciary responsibilities.""' Therefore, the members "must be treated
as participating under the common law of trusts."' 5°
The Department of Labor filed an action similar to that in Benvenuto
against the trustees of a 5,000-member New York union's legal services
plan."5 According to the complaint, "the trustees acted imprudently
when they caused the plan to enter into agreements for legal services
without considering alternative service providers or methods of delivery,
and... failed to implement a system to monitor and control the quality
and cost-effectiveness of services rendered."' In another case, United
States v. Fisher,153 the court presented a union's prepaid legal services
plan in a rather sinister light. The defendant lawyers were charged with
having given "illegal kickbacks to the union officials from the first day
of the prepaid legal services contract.''
Disputes between contractual providers and legal services benefit
funds can also be ugly, as evidenced by Mirkin, Barre, Saltzstein,
Gordon, Hermann & Kreisberg, P.C. v. Noto."5  A legislative
committee discharged the Mirkin firm following a finding by the
committee that the firm overcharged and otherwise acted unprofessionally
in providing services to a civil service employees' union.'5 The firm
sued the committee members, at least one of whom also served as a plan
trustee, alleging that they had conspired to induce the plan to breach its
contract The defendant trustees counterclaimed, alleging that other plan
tustees had conspired with the firn "to enable it to obtain lavish retainer
agreements whereby it would be the sole provider of prepaid legal
services"' to plan members.
These cases illustrate the general principle that proof of a breach of
duty by a plan trustee must exist in order for an ERISA legal services
plan attorney to be found liable for damages to the plan.'"' While the
149 Id.
150 Id.
... BILUNGS, supra note 75, § 6.91 (Supp. 1985) (citing Civ. No. 85-1713 (S.D.N.Y.,
Mar. 5, 1985) (unreported)).1 2 Id.
13 692 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 11m reported case arose from the defendants'
motions to dismiss certain indictments against them on the grounds of prosecutorial
misconduct. The court denied their motions but failed to report the eventual outcome of
the case against the awyers.
Id. at 499.
15. 94 F.R.D. 184 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
15 Id. at 185.
" Id. at 186.
" Julimne Joy Knox, Nieto v. Ecker: Incorporation of Nonfiduciary Liability Under
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plant legal services providers may, as in Fisher, be guilty of other infractions,
they are unlikely to be held independently accountable for breaching their
fiduciary duty unless their actions in regard to plan assets endow the lawyers
with fiduciary status.'15 However, by virtue of 'providing services ... to
the [ERISA] plan," 6 plan lawyers are "parties in interest" and are thus
prohibited from engaging in the furnishing of services to the plan' for
more than "reasonable compensation."' The .party in interest is also
vulnerable to an excise tax of 5% of the amount involved in a prohibited
transaction," even if the party in interest was unaware that ERISA
prohibited her actions.'"
In order to avoid liability from their conduct in administering the plan,
plan trustees should do the following: identify the type of delivery system
best suited to the needs of the group served, establish reasonable
compensation levels, establish an actuarially sound schedule of benefits, and
document the basis for each of these decisions.'" Once the plan is in place,
the trustees' duties include employing qualified lawyers,"6 making timely
payments to eligible beneficiaries," avoiding excessive payments,'" and
ERS4, 73 MINN. L. REv. 1303, 1310 & n.32 (1989).
159 On the, other hand, a fiduciay such as a plan administrator or trustee who
participates in a decision to hire himself as a provider of legal services would violate both
the prohibition against self-dealing, ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(1), and the so-called
multiple services rule. See HousE CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 295, 314
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 5038, 5095.
,60 See ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(B) (defining "parties in interest").
1-- Id. § 1106(a)(1)(C).
162 Id. § 1108(b)(2), (c)(2). The only prepaid legal services case involving a party in
interest cited in BLmNGs, supra note 75, § 6.105, is Marshall v. Sackman, No. 79 Civ.
0838 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 1979). Mr. Sacknan and his father were charged with a number
of ERISA infractions, and the party in interest status does not appear to have been a
decisive factor.
1.. See I.R.C. § 4975(a) (1988). Only the Secretary of Labor may bring this action.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(6) (1988).
16 I.LC. § 4975(a), (b), (e)(2).
" See BILIuNGS, supra note 75, § 6.63.
16 See Id. § 6.96 (discussing Marshall v. Sackman, No. 79 Civ. 0838 (S.D.N.Y., Feb.
14, 1979) (involving a consent decree that reimbursed $150,000 the plan had paid to the
son of plan trustee, who worked as a legal services plan director in a series of positions)).
" While an employer may not amend an ERISA welfare benefit plan retroactively,
Winpisinger v. Aurora Corp., 456 F. Supp. 559, 573 (N.D. Ohio 1978), it is well
established (although controversial) that an employer may reduce benefits. See McGann
v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. demied sub. nom.
Greenberg v. H & H Music Co., 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
168 While cases that involve excessive payment to parties in interest or fiduciaries are
more common, excessive payment to any party is an infiaction of ERISA's standards. 29
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scrupulously observing the rules concerning provision of services to
themselves and other fiduciaries. 6'
Two recent cases 7' address the issue of the lawyer status as a
fiduciary of ERISA trust assets when holding the proceeds of a settlement and
disposing of them in contravention of a subrogation agreement. The lawyers
in these cases were not part of any group legal services agreement with the
employee benefit trust fund. Rather, private parties hired them for specific
cases in accordance with subrogation agreements requiring that the client
reimburse the plan out of settlement funds for amounts expended by the plan
to defray medical expenses."' Even though the subrogation agreements
embodied the attorneys' sole connection with the ERISA plan, these cases
still have significant implications for those lawyers providing prepaid or other
group legal services under an ERISA plan agreement.
In Chapman v. Klemick,73 the lawyer advised his client to violate a
subrogation agreement that the client had signed in order to obtain payment
of medical expenses by his union trust fund. The trust fund based its case
on the application of ERISA's definition of a fiduciary"'75 to an attorney
who exercises discretionary control over money held as an asset of the trust
Rind under the subrogation agreement. The key inquiry was whether
Klemick met the definition of "fiduciary" by exercising "discretionary control
or authority over any Trust Fund assets."'7 The district court held that in
deciding how to allocate funds (ie., taking his own fee before advising the
client to spend the rest as soon as possible), the attorney met the
"discretionary control" test. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, 79 distinguishing the fiduciary position of an attorney rendering
services to an ERISA plan from the non-fiduciary role of the attorney who
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
"9 See, e.g., BILLNGS, supra note 75, § 6.100 (citing ERISA Opinion Letter No. 78-
29 (1978) (finding trust indenture provision authorizing reimbursement of trustee legal
fees incurred in defending charges of violation of fiduciary duties unenforceable)).
'" Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Welfare Fund v. Gentner,
815 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Nev. 1993); Chapman v. Klemick, 750 F. Supp. 520 (S.D. Fla.
1990), rev'd, 3 F.3d 1508 (11th Cir. 1993).
1 Gentner, 815 F. Supp. at 1355; Chapman, 750 F. Supp. at 521.
'71 Gentner, 815 F. Supp. at 1356; Chapman, 750 F. Supp. at 521.
17 750 F. Supp. 520 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
'4 Id. at 521.
171 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
' Chapman, 750 F. Supp. at 522.
in Id.
17 Id. at 523.
' 3 F.3d 1508 (l1th Cir. 1993).
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represents a plan beneficiary.8  The court noted consistent case law'
and regulations stating that "an attorney who renders legal services to an
employee benefit ordinarily will not become a plan fiduciary, where those
services amount to no more than an attomey 'usual professional
functions.
, , 182
In Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International Union
Welfare Fund v. Gentner, the Nevada District Court recently held that a
lawyer who fails to make the disposition of settlement proceeds specified by
a subrogation agreement is not a fiduciary under ERISA. The case is
distinguishable from Chapman for several reasons. First, the Nevada client;
unlike Klemicks client, had significant assets remaining from which the trust
fund could be reimbursed.1" Moreover, Gentner, the Nevada attorney, may
have had a good faith reason for contesting the subrogation agreement, which
was signed under protest. 8 Because of these distinctions, the Nevada court
explicitly "decline[d] to go as far as Chapman.'"
While no reported case has addressed this fact pattern in the context of
an employer-sponsored legal services plan, such a case could arise if a legal
services plan lawyer, either under a full-coverage benefit plan or by separate
agreement; took on an employee case. As a "party in interest" to the
contested subrogated fuids, the plan lawyer holding discretion over plan
fiuds would be especially vulnerable to imputation of fiduciary status.
2. Administrative Issues
A number of Department of Labor opinions address the status of a legal
services plan in regard to ERISA.'8 For example, a 1982 ERISA opinion
letter held that the Michigan Dental Association's coverage of professional
liability of its members was not an ERISA plan because the Association did
not employ the beneficiaries of the plan." Because having ERISA status
"
0 Id. at 1511.
, "We are aware of no case in which a lawyer for an ERISA plan beneficiary, as
opposed to a lawyer for an ERISA plan, has been alleged to be an ERISA fiduciary." Id.
at 1510.
1 Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5).
1 815 F. Sutp. 1354, 1359 (D. Nov. 1993).
18 Newell, a flund participant, recovered almost $590,000 from Travelers nsrance,
while the subrogation agreement only required that he reimburse the trust fund
$90,544.16. Id. at 1356.
" Id. at 1355.
"t Id. at 1360.
11 See opinions cited in BmLNGS, supra note 75, §§ 6.14-.18.
1 BMLINGS, sqpra note 75, § 6.14 (Supp. 1985) (citing ERISA Opinion Letter No.
81-6A (1982)).
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can provide federal jurisdiction and generally limit recovery," the status
of a proprietary employee benefit plan in relation to ERISA is an important
issue and requires cautious choice of terminology. In United States v.
Blood," for instance, a Maryland federal district court convicted a
marketer of prepaid legal services plans of embezzlement from an ERISA
plan and failure to file required ERISA reports. 9 The defendant, relying
in part on the prosecution allusion to the plans as insurance, appealed on the
ground that the plans were "insurance" and thus exempt from ERISA
regulation." The Fourth Circuit held that ERISA governed the plans and
noted that the government's use of the word "insurance" in its argument was
inadvertent rather than an admission of plan characterization.93
Other recent cases help to define the relationship between a plan and its
sponsors and providers. The court in Sullivan v. Salem Plumbing, Inc."
noted that 'ERISA provides that a trustee of a benefit plan may bring a civil
action against an employer to recover delinquent fund contributions.' 95 On
the other hand, as Milonas v. Santa Clara County Hotel, Motel, Restaurant
Employees and Bartenders Legal Fund% states, a suit for amounts owed
by a plan to a contract provider of legal services does not fall within the
statuteft . ERISA does not give federal courts jurisdiction over an action
brought by an independent contractor, as its language limits private rights of
action to participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries.'98
IL SYNERGY AND CONFLICT UNDER JOINT REGULATION
Conflicts may arise between the lawyer's status as provider under an
ERISA plan and her ethical duty to her client. For example, the Illinois
S ee cases cited supra note 115.
190 806 F.2d 1218 (4th Cir. 1986); see also In re Fortement Ass'n, 403 N.Y.S.2d 290
(App. Div. 1977) (involving the court's approval of the corporation's application to form
a prepaid legal services plan).
1 Blood, 806 F.2d at 1220.
"Id.
'
9 Id. at 1221.
L 1992 WL 212614 (N.D. III. Aug. 27, 1992).
Id. at *1 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)); see also Laborers Fringe Benefit Funds v.
Northwest Concrete & Constr., Inc., 640 F.2d 1350, 1352 (6th Cir. 1981) (allowing action
in equity by plan fiduciary to enforce required contnbutions); Plumber's Pension Fund v.
Pittinman Plumbing & Heating Co., 1990 WL 139142, at *2 (N.D. Ill Sept. 14, 1990)
(noting an absence of a duty to arbitrate such claims unless expressly required by
contract).
123 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 10,430, at 23,069 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
Id. at 23,071.
Lw Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132).
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State Bar Ethics Committee found that since any member of an employer-
sponsored legal services plan could become a client in the future, a
lawyer who represents a party adverse to a plan beneficiary and receives
capitation or other fees from the plan has a conflict of interest." While
other states do not appear to have followed this opinion, it raises a
general concern over client identity similar to that faced by an attorney
representing a corporate client with wide-ranging interests and
subsidiaries. The lawyer whose practice encompasses both individual and
group clients would be well advised to ascertain the identity of her
client's opponents at the earliest opportunity and investigate any
possibility of membership in a client group. This duty is akin to a
corporate legal representative's duty of ensuring that his clients'
affiliations do not conflict.2"
A more specific conflict between ERISA standards and state ethics
rules arose in the Chapman v. Klemick °' and Hotel Employees &
Restaurant Employees International Union Welfare Fund v. Gentner2°
cases. In Klemick, the defendant attorney argued that if the court were to
find that he held an ERISA fiduciary status, he would have "a conflict of
interest between his duty to the Trust Fund and his duty as an attorney
to his client."2 3 The court dismissed this contention, noting the
presence of similar conflicts in other areas, such as "the requirement that
an attorney file an 8300 form2' upon receipt of $10,000 in cash from
SI. St. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics Op. 732 (1981), reprinted in
Professional Ethics Opinions, ILL. B.J. 586, 590 (May 1991). The Committee found the
existence of an impennissible conflict of interest where a member of the plan had asserted
a claim against a non-plan client of an attorney who was under contract with the plan.
The lawyer's acceptance of a portion of the annual fee paid to plan lawyers created a
lawyer-client relationship with all potential clients who were members of the plan.
Because the identity of a client's adversary as a member of the plan may be impossible
to determine, the burden of this rule, if literally applied, could be overwhelming.
Fortunately, this seems to be an isolated opinion. A more recent Oregon opinion
states that a client who is a beneficiary of a corporation's plan is '!not an actual client of
the providing firm" until the standard attorney-client relationship is established. Legal
Ethics Comm. of the Oregon State Bar Op. 1991-46 (1991), summarized in Laws. Man.
of Prof. Ethics (ABA/BNA) 1001:7106 (1992).
' See, e.g., Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs. Inc., 869 F.2d 578, 584 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (disqualifying a law finn after a merger with another firm resulted in the
simultaneous representation of adverse parties).
20' 750 F. Supp. 520 (S.D. Fla. 1990), rev'd 3 F.3d 1508 (11th Cir. 1993).
22 815 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Nev. 1993).
2' K/emick, 750 F. Supp. at 523.
2 An 8300 form is a tax reporting form for transactions of $10,000 or more. 26 CFR
1.60501-1.
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a client."2 5 Both situations reflect compelling policies "to protect the
interests of the many as opposed to the greed of the one."2 6
The Gentner court, which rejected the characterization of the plan
attorney as a fiduciary,"7 was more sensitive to the conflict between
state and federal regulation. Nevertheless, it cautioned that its holding
should not be interpreted to countenance "the unfettered right or
discretion of attorneys to dispose of assets as they see fit when they are
aware of a third party's rights under a Subrogation Agreement."2" The
Klemick and Gentner cases offer the same solution to the lawyer's
conflict: place the contested funds in an escrow account and bring a
declaratory judgment action regarding the funds' appropriate
disposition.2°
These examples of contradictory burdens placed on ERISA legal
services plan lawyers by state and federal regulations logically lead to
three conclusions. First, lawyers providing services to plan members
rather than to the plan itself are unlikely to be characterized as
fiduciaries." Secondly, apparent conflicts can be resolved by strategies
(e.g., conflicts screening or declaratory actions) that are commonplace in
legal practice. Third, the tension between ERISA regulations and state
ethical mandates reflects the same concerns that arise when a lawyer
represents either a party comprising multiple entities2 1 or a client
whose fees are paid by a third party 1
The concerns that arise in more conventional types of legal practice
govern ethical requirements and administrative regulations for group legal
services."' For example, when a lawyer under contract with a
sponsoring group provides services to a client member and documents
these services to the payor, she will inevitably disclose the fact and extent
of representation. If the matter in issue involves a dispute with the
sponsoring group, the lawyer has a conflict of interest. If the plan does
20 K/emick; 750 F. Supp. at 523 n.7.
0 Id. at 523.
Gentner, 815 F. Supp. at 1359. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals lewise
rejected this characterization. Chapman v. Klemick, 3 F.3d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir. 1993).
SId. at 1360.
Klemick; 750 F. Supp. at 523; Gentner, 815 F. Supp. at 1360.
2,0 See supra notes 170-86 and accompanying text.
2" See MODEL RULEs OF PR FaSSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.7 cmat.
21 See id.
- See Wilkins, supra note 8, at 806; Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlauyers in the
Business of Law: Does the One Who Had the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTNGS
L.J. 577, 588 (1989).
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not cover the nature or extent of the services requested, professional
judgment may be implicated.
CONCLUSION
National regulatory standards for lawyers have been the subject of
scholarly speculation for many years. The states regulate the legal
practice with a number of ethical rules, generally through bar association
actions. The federal government regulates lawyers who work under
contract with employer-sponsored legal services plans via ERISA. Not
only have these lawyers survived the experience, but group legal services
seem to be undergoing a resurgence. The model of joint state-federal
standards has implications for many forms of legal practice when third
parties pay legal fees or several states are involved. Federal regulation,
far from chilling legal independence, has protected group services from
the organized bar's efforts to stifle their growth.
While group legal services plans currently cover less than ten percent
of the U.S. population 14 the popularity of insurance in our risk-averse
society suggests that consumer interest in membership will increase.
Increasing competition for clients is likely to make. participation in such
plans more attractive to lawyers. Insurance vendors, constantly in search
of new products, will further stimulate the market. The decline of unions
in recent years and the general concern with the cost of employee benefits
may curb growth in the use of collectively bargained plans subject to
ERISA regulation. Regardless of enrollment trends and the mix of plan
types, group legal services plans have attained the status of a permanent
feature on the legal landscape." '
Although ERISA authorizes plan beneficiaries to bring actions against
plan lawyers," 6 there are no reported cases involving actions by
individual participants.2 7 This absence of "consumer" lawsuits appears
' The American Prepaid Legal Services Institute cites a 1987 figure of 13 million
enrollees. AMERICAN PREPAID LEGAL SERVICE INsTruTE, OPENNG THE DOOR TO
AFFORDABLE LEGAL SERvICES 2 (1988). See also Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABAIBNA) 81:2505 (1988). This figure should be increased by any dependents covered
under these plans.
"S A list distributed by the American Prepaid Legal Services Institute includes
twenty-three "organizations offering personal legal service plans to consumers and
groups" in all fifty states. American Prepaid Legal Services Institute, Organizations
Offering Personal Legal Service Plans to Consumers and Groups (August 10, 1993)
(unpublished).
" 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2); see BIvNGS, supra note 75, § 6.115.
2'7 However, individuals have brought state bar disciplinary actions. See I1M. St. Bar
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in striking contrast to their predominance in ERISA health benefit plan
case law"' It may reflect the historical dominance of union
sponsorship of group legal services benefit plans, but union actions are
also scarce. Another explanation may be the routine nature of most
services covered under the plans. Regardless of the reason, the paucity of
ERISA cases on legal services plans suggests that ERISA regulation at
its current level would be inadequate to meet the challenge of expanded
group legal services plan activity.
The Model Rules have eliminated most distinctions between practice
under group legal services plans and other types of legal practice." 9
The Model Rules, however, provide little positive guidance in dealing
with the very real differences between employer-sponsored plan practice
and the individual or corporate representation that underlies most of the
Rules' paradigms. State regulation of group legal services plans can be
better structured to complement ERISA regulations by including
provisions similar to those in the Model Rules that address insurance
defense and other third party payor circumstances. For example, these
provisions could explicitly address the conflict that arises when a plan
and its beneficiary disagree on subrogation rights against a
settlement n  Likewise, the Model Rules' comments regarding
permissible and impermissible client conflicts should allude to legal
services plan clients.
Most, if not all, apparent disparities between ERISA and state ethics
rules could be resolved in this manner. ERISA would continue to preempt
state law but would not place the ERISA plan attorney in an ethical
dilemma. It is important to remember that Congress intended ERISA's
preemption of state benefit plan regulation to facilitate the development
of employer-sponsored group legal services plans. Furthermore, this
preemption has the effect of freeing benefit plans, if not the lawyers who
participate in themrn from state regulation.
Group legal service is a concept worth defending. Given this
conclusion, the state or national bar should undertake the effort of
Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics Op. 732 (1981); Legal Ethics Comm. of the Oregon
State Bar Op. 1991-46 (1991), summarized in Laws. Man. of Prof. Ethics (ABA/BNA)
1001:7106 (1992).
" See generally Costich, snqra note 137 (discussing the applicable de novo review
for courts' examination of ERISA health benefit plan decisions).
= See supra notes 69-94 and accompanying text.
22 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.7 cmt.
" See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
2 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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harmonizing state and federal rules. If lawyers are concerned with
equalizing access to representation, they must consider strategies other
than the traditional fee-for-service or contingency fee arrangements. By
assuring access to a "safety net" of basic legal services and removing the
specter of unanticipated financial burdens, legal services plans offer
consumers the same type of security as health benefit plans. In addition,
group legal services plans present an opportunity to improve the caliber
of legal services since they often provide a mechanism for assessing
quality, outcomes, and cost-effectiveness.'m
Unlike the individual client, the employer-sponsored plan wields
considerable economic clout, especially when negotiating for "repeat"
business. As one commentator notes,
most individuals are "one shot" users of legal services. These plans
effectively make the sponsoring organization ... a "repeat player" who
can act as a sophisticated intermediary between the individual and the
lawyer. Thus, the plan can standardize terms of engagement (including
fees), monitor client complaints, collect information about outcomes,
perform random audits, and generally engage in the kind of detailed
evaluation and review that corporations use to protect themselves
against agency problems. m
Trustees of an ERISA legal services plan have a duty to perform these
quality assurance functions as part of their fiduciary role, while enrollees
in non-ERISA legal insurance plans similarly benefit from state regulation
of the insurance industrytm
The cases that have arisen under ERISA regulation of lawyers do not
indicate the existence of an unresolvable conflict between state and
federal standards." ERISA regulations, complementing those of the
states, provide an additional assurance for the client and the other
employees served by the ERISA plan by requiring meticulous attention
to the disposition of plan funds. ' 7 These regulations address the fact
" It was precisely the lack of such monitoring that the court criticized severely in
Benvenuto v. Schneider, 678 F. Supp. 51, 52 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). See supra notes 143-50
and accompanying text. ERISA regulation reinforces the economic benefits gained by
close attention to quality control. See Russel G. Pearce et al., Project: An Assessment of
Alternative Strategies for Increasing Access to Legal Services, 90 YALE L.L 122, 129
(1980).
2m Wilkdns, supra note 8, at 880.
225See BII2.NGs, supra note 75, §§ 8.30-.34.
s See supra notes 143-98 and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 170-86 and accompanying text.
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that the ERISA plan beneficiary has a legitimate interest in the integrity
of his plan in addition to his interest in the legal representation for which
he has bargained with his employer. Apparent dilemmas concerning
conflicts of client interest or disputes over the disposition of funds are
readily resolved with reference to strategies familiar to lawyers who
represent corporate or insured clients. The ERISA legal services plan
would thus appear to be an appropriate framework for experimentation
with new models of professional regulation wherever pooled funding,
third-party sponsorship, or multistate activity arises.
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